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This publication is motivated, in part, by
the huge increase in ethanol production
capacity in the U.S. in the past two
years and the impact that increase is
having on corn and other commodity
prices. The current fixed ethanol subsidy
was established in an era of cheap oil,
but with oil around $60, the subsidy
provides very large profits to ethanol
producers and thereby a substantial
incentive for the industry to grow. With
this industry growth, demand for corn
grows in parallel and thus its price. This
publication reviews the history of U.S.
ethanol policy, explains the economics

of ethanol production in today’s market
environment, and outlines some policy
alternatives that could be considered for
the future.

U.S. Ethanol Policy History
Ethanol has been produced for fuel in
the United States for at least 26 years. The
industry launch was initiated by a subsidy
of 40 cents per gallon provided in the
Energy Policy Act of 1978. Between 1978
and today, the ethanol subsidy has ranged
between 40 and 60 cents per gallon. The
history of subsidy changes is provided
in Table 1. The federal subsidy today is

Table 1. History of Ethanol Subsidy Legislation
1978

Energy Tax Act of 1978

$0.40 per gallon of ethanol tax exemption on the $0.04 gasoline excise tax

1980

Crude Oil Windfall Profit Tax Act and
the Energy Security Act

Promoted energy conservation and domestic fuel development

1982

Surface Transportation Assistance Act

Increased tax exemption to $0.50 per gallon of ethanol and increased the
gasoline excise tax to $0.09 per gallon

1984

Tax Reform Act

Increased tax exemption to $0.06 per gallon

1988

Alternative Motor Fuels Act

Created research and development programs and provided fuel economy credits
to automakers

1990

Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act

Ethanol tax incentive extended to 2000 but decreased to $0.54 per gallon of
ethanol

1990

Clean Air Act amendments

Acknowledged contribution of motor fuels to air pollution

1992

Energy Policy Act

Tax deductions allowed on vehicles that could run on E85

1998

Transportation Efficiency Act of the
21st Century

Ethanol subsidies extended through 2007 but reduced to $0.51 per gallon of
ethanol by 2005

2004

Jobs Creation Act

2005

Energy Policy Act

Changed the mechanism of the ethanol subsidy to a blender tax credit instead
of the previous excise tax exemption. Also extended the ethanol tax exemption
to 2010.
Established the Renewable Fuel Standard starting at 4 billion gallons in 2006 and
rising to 7.5 billion in 2012.

Source: (Commerce, 2006) North Dakota Chamber of Commerce.
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51 cents per gallon. Throughout all the history, the
subsidy has always been a fixed amount that does not
change with crude oil price or corn prices (Tyner and
Quear, 2006).

2002-2006. The coefficients are all significant, and the
regressions explain between two-thirds and threefourths of the variance in ethanol prices.
Except for the summer of 2006, the spread between
ethanol and gasoline was greater in earlier years than
in the period 2002 and after. Ethanol even fell below
gasoline for a few months in 2005, leading some to
believe that the “natural” price for ethanol would
be on an energy-equivalent basis with gasoline. The
spread increased substantially in summer 2006 because of a change in federal rules that took effect May
8, 2006.

In addition to the federal blending credit subsidy,
there are also some other federal and state subsidies.
In fact, Koplow (2006) calculates the total subsidy
available for ethanol in 2006 to range between $1.05
and $1.38 per gallon of ethanol or between $1.42 and
$1.87 per gallon of gasoline equivalent. Many would
regard these figures as being high, but they do demonstrate that the ethanol industry has been one with
substantial subsidies.

As of that date, the federal requirement for blending a certain percentage of oxygen ended. One of
the major sources of oxygen had been a compound
named “MTBE.” However, this compound is highly
toxic and was found in the water supplies in several
areas and banned by many states. With there no longer being a requirement to blend a certain amount of
oxygen, many companies feared legal prosecution if
they continued to use MTBE and switched to ethanol,
which increased substantially the demand and price
of ethanol.

Ethanol Economics
Ethanol gets its value from the energy it contains and
its additive value. Ethanol has value as a gasoline additive because it contains more oxygen than gasoline
(and therefore causes the blend to burn cleaner)
and because it has a much higher octane than gasoline (112 compared with 87 for regular gasoline).
Historically, ethanol prices have been higher than
gasoline prices because of the additive value and because of the federal and state subsidies.

Components of Ethanol Value
As indicated above, there are three components to the
market value of ethanol: energy, additive, and subsidy. It is interesting to portray these values in terms
of the relationship between crude oil price and the
maximum a corn dry mill could afford to pay for corn
at each crude price. To estimate such a relationship,
many assumptions were needed, and these assumption are detailed in Appendix A.
Figure 2 displays the relationships between crude oil
price and breakeven corn price on the basis of energy
equivalence, energy equivalence plus additive value
(assumed to be 25 cents per gallon for this illustration), and energy equivalence plus additive value plus
the current federal blending subsidy of 51 cents per
gallon. The energy equivalence line was done assuming a figure of 70%, slightly more than the direct
energy equivalent.

Figure 1 provides the monthly ethanol and gasoline
prices for Omaha, Nebraska, between 1982 and 2006.
In Figure 1, one can see that the relationship between
gasoline and ethanol prices began to change in 2002.
Figure 1 also contains the regression fits for the entire
period and for the separate periods 1982-2001 and

Figure 1. Historic Ethanol and Gasoline Prices (Omaha, NE)
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Using Figure 2, one can trace out the breakeven corn
price for any given crude oil price. For example,
with crude oil at $60/bbl., the breakeven corn price
is $4.82/bu., including both the additive premium
and the fixed federal subsidy. This figure is for a new

Purdue extension

not all the subsidy gets passed through to dry millers
and to the corn price. The first sensitivity assumes the
subsidy is effectively 40 cents instead of 51 cents. The
breakeven corn price with the fixed subsidy becomes
$4.50 instead of $4.82.
Next, suppose that the additive value is 30 cents per
gallon instead of 25. The corn breakeven price becomes $5.02. With the additive value of 40 cents, the
corn breakeven becomes $5.37. There is no doubt that
ethanol has an additive value as an oxygenate and for
octane, but it is impossible to predict what it will be
as ethanol production increases beyond the needs for
octane and added oxygen.
Another type of sensitivity would be to assume that
ethanol might be priced equivalent to gasoline on
a volumetric basis instead of an energy basis. Some
argue that in the long term refiners will choose to
modify their refining process to produce a lower octane gasoline, say 84 octane, which could be blended
at 10% ethanol to produce the standard 87 octane
regular gasoline.

Figure 2. Breakeven Corn and Crude Prices with Ethanol Priced
on Energy and Premium Bases plus Ethanol Subsidy

plant and includes 12% return on equity and 8% debt
interest. If we consider an existing plant with capital
already recovered, we add $0.78 per bushel to yield a
breakeven corn price of $5.60.

We conducted two sensitivity analyses—one with
the supplemental additive value then at zero and one
with the additive value at 20 cents. With volumetric
equivalent pricing and no additional additive value,
the corn breakeven becomes $6.20. With volumetric
pricing and 20 cents additional additive value, the
corn breakeven becomes $6.89. In all these cases except the lower subsidy pass through, dry millers could
afford to pay more for corn than in the base case.
Combinations of these cases could be done as well,
but the approximate outcomes can be inferred from
these results.

Sensitivity Analysis
Any number of sensitivity analyses could be performed on the calculations contained in this publication. Table 2 provides results on some important
sensitivity analyses. All the reported results are the
corn breakeven for $60 crude oil. First, suppose that
Table 2. Sensitivity Analysis for Corn Breakeven Prices
Sensitivity Case

During most of the history of the federal ethanol
subsidy, crude oil prices ranged between $20 and
$30 per barrel. With crude oil price in that range, the
fixed federal subsidy did not put significant pressure on corn prices. However, with crude oil today
around $60, there is significant pressure on corn
prices. Ethanol investments in the United States have
been highly profitable during the past two years, with
payback periods as short as one year.

Corn
Breakeven
with $60
Crude Oil

Subsidy pass-through equal to $0.40 instead of $0.51

$4.50

Additive value equal to $0.30 instead of $0.25

$5.02

Additive value equal to $0.40 instead of $0.25

$5.37

Ethanol priced equal to gasoline on a volumetric basis instead
of energy basis with no supplemental additive value

$6.20

Ethanol priced equal to gasoline on a volumetric basis instead
of energy basis with $0.20 supplemental additive value

$6.89
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This high profitability has attracted significant new
investment in the industry, as shown in Figure 3.
Ethanol production grew 1 billion gallons in 2006
and is expected to grow 3 billion gallons in 2007, a
doubling in two years. Because of this current and
expected future growth in ethanol production, corn
prices skyrocketed in fall 2006. In just a few months,
prices were up from about $2.25 to $3.70 per bushel,
an increase of about 65%. This leap in corn prices is
leading to an emerging opposition to ethanol subsidies on the part of animal agriculture, export markets,
and other corn users. Some are also concerned about
the $4 billion cost of the subsidy in 2007.

• Find a way to limit the quantity of ethanol that
would receive the subsidy, thereby permitting better control of the growth of corn-based ethanol.
• Provide higher subsidies for cellulose-based
ethanol in hopes of accelerating development and
implementation of that technology.
• Convert the subsidy from a fixed subsidy to one
that varies with the price of crude oil.

No Changes
Certainly, one option is to do nothing—to let the
other corn-using sectors adjust to higher corn prices.
But as can be seen from the results in the ethanol
economics and sensitivity analyses sections above,
that option could lead to substantially higher corn
prices than we have seen historically. It certainly
would lead to higher costs for the livestock industry
(happening already) and ultimately for consumers of
livestock products. It also would lead to reduced corn
exports. The breakeven corn prices provided above
are maximums the ethanol industry could pay to
retain profitability.
Whether these prices would be reached would depend on the rate of growth of the ethanol industry
compared with the rate of growth of corn supply.
According to the Renewable Fuels Association, the
operating ethanol capacity as of 29 December 2006
was 5.386 billion gallons, and 6.004 billion gallons
were under construction (Association, 2007). Part of
the 6 billion gallons under construction will come on
stream in 2007, leading to a substantial increase in
corn demand. We can certainly expect to see continued pressure on corn prices if no change is made in
federal subsidy policy.

Figure 3. Ethanol Production

Future Policy Alternatives
In essence, the situation is that we are living an unintended consequence of the fixed ethanol subsidy.
When it was created, no one could envision $60 oil,
but today $60 oil is reality, and many believe oil prices
are likely to remain high. So given this reality, what
future federal policy options could be considered that
would support the ethanol industry but provide less
incentive for rapid growth in the industry leading to
abnormally high corn prices? There are several possible policy alternatives that could be considered:

Lower Fixed Subsidy
Because the current pressure on corn prices comes
from the combination of $60 oil and 51 cent per gallon subsidy, one option would be to maintain a fixed
subsidy but lower it to a level more in line with the
higher oil price. Figure 4 depicts the corn breakeven
prices with a 20 cent per gallon subsidy instead of the
current 51 cent per gallon subsidy. The corn breakeven price for $60 oil becomes $3.77 instead of $4.82

• Make no changes, and let the other corn using sectors (particularly livestock) adjust as needed.
• Keep the subsidy fixed, but reduce it to a level
more appropriate for crude oil prices around $60.
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Figure 4. Breakeven Corn and Crude Prices with Ethanol Priced on Figure 5. Breakeven Corn and Crude Prices with Ethanol Priced
Energy and Premium Bases plus Lower Ethanol Subsidy
on Energy and Premium Bases plus Variable Ethanol Subsidy

under current policy. However, the fixed subsidy still
has the disadvantage of not responding to possible
future changes in oil prices. If oil fell to $40, the corn
breakeven would be $2.40, and it would be $4.46 for
$70 oil.

compared to $4.82 with the fixed subsidy shown in
Figure 3. With oil at $50, the corn breakeven would be
$2.77 for a new plant with the variable subsidy. $40 oil
would support a corn price of $2.27 for a new plant
and $3.05 for an existing plant with capital recovered. $70 oil would yield a breakeven corn price of
$3.77 with no ethanol subsidy. So the variable subsidy
provides a safety net for ethanol producers without
putting inordinate pressure on corn prices.

Variable Subsidy
In designing a variable subsidy, there are two key parameters: the price of crude oil at which the subsidy
begins and the rate of change of the subsidy as crude
oil price falls. We illustrate the variable subsidy using
$60 crude as the point at which the subsidy begins.
That is, when crude is higher than $60, there is no
subsidy, but some level of subsidy exists for any crude
oil price lower than $60. In this illustration, we use a
subsidy change value of 2.5 cents per gallon of ethanol for each dollar crude oil falls below $60. Thus, if
crude oil were $50, the subsidy per gallon of ethanol
would be 25 cents. If crude oil were $40, the ethanol
subsidy would be 50 cents per gallon. Therefore, for
any crude oil price above $40, the ethanol subsidy
would be lower than the current fixed subsidy. For
any crude price less than $40, the subsidy would be
greater than the current fixed subsidy of 51 cents per
gallon.
Figure 5 illustrates the corn breakeven price for different crude oil prices if this variable subsidy were in
effect. In this case, the corn breakeven price at $60 oil
for a new ethanol plant would be $3.08 per bushel,

The difference between the two subsidy approaches
can be seen in Figure 6, which displays both the fixed
and variable subsidies. Examining this figure, it is
clear why the variable subsidy provides so much less
pressure on corn prices. For any crude oil price above
$60, there is no ethanol subsidy with the variable sub-

Figure 6. Breakeven Corn and Crude Prices with Ethanol
Priced on Energy and Premium Bases plus Variable and Fixed
Ethanol Subsidy
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sidy, so ethanol plant investment decisions are made
based on market forces alone instead of being driven
by the federal subsidy.

If government is interested in reducing upward
pressure on corn prices, alternatives to the current
fixed 51 cent per gallon subsidy could be considered.
One option would be to lower the fixed subsidy. This
alternative would reduce the pressure on corn prices
but would still provide ethanol subsidies under higher
oil prices when they are not needed. It also does not
change based on underlying market conditions.

For any crude price between $40 and $60, the variable
subsidy is less than the fixed subsidy, thereby providing less incentive to invest and less pressure on corn
prices, but maintaining a safety net. However, with
the fixed subsidy, ethanol plant investment decisions
continue to be heavily influenced by the government
subsidy, even at crude oil prices that render ethanol
very profitable in the absence of a subsidy. Thus, the
variable subsidy alternative is one option that merits
further consideration in the policy decision process.

A second option would be a variable subsidy that provided an ethanol subsidy that changes with the crude
oil price. The option evaluated in this publication provided no subsidy for crude oil price above $60, and a
subsidy that increased 2.5 cents per gallon for each $1
crude price is below $60. This option yields a breakeven corn price for $60 oil of $3.08/bu., compared with
$4.82/bu under the current policy.

Other Alternatives
Two other options mentioned above were a) to find a
way to limit the quantity of ethanol that would receive
the subsidy, thereby permitting better control of the
growth of corn-based ethanol and b) to provide higher subsidies for cellulose-based ethanol in hopes of
accelerating development and implementation of that
technology. Either of these options could be implemented with either the fixed or the variable subsidy.
So long as corn-based ethanol is highly profitable, it
will be difficult to stimulate investment in cellulose
technology because it is much more uncertain and at
present more costly than corn-based ethanol production.

Another option, clearly, is to make no change in current policy. With this alternative, the other corn-using
sectors such as livestock production and corn exports
would be forced to make the needed adjustments.
Less corn would be used in these sectors, and prices
for all livestock products likely would increase.

Conclusions
Ethanol has been subsidized in the U.S. since 1978,
and the subsidy has ranged from 40 to 60 cents per
gallon over that period. Currently, the subsidy is 51
cents per gallon, and combined with $60 oil, ethanol
production has become highly profitable. This profitability has stimulated a huge increase in ethanol
production capacity, with 6 billion gallons of new
capacity under construction as of January 2007. This
increase in ethanol production is increasing corn
demand and prices. Under the current policy, ethanol
producers could still invest profitably in new production with corn price as high as $4.82/bu. Other
assumptions could yield substantially higher corn
prices.
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Appendix A
4) ethanol yield per bushel of corn is assumed to be
2.65 gallons—Newer plants may have higher yield,
but this figure is close to the industry average.

The link between crude oil price and breakeven corn
price requires numerous assumptions. Following
are the most important assumptions updated to
November 2006.

5) Capital cost for the plant is assumed to be $1.80
per gallon of capacity, which translates to about
29 cents per gallon produced—Older plants had
considerably lower capital cost, and much of the
capital probably has already been paid off. The
plant is assumed to operate at full capacity.

1) relationship between crude oil price and
gasoline price—This relationship is given by the
equation below:
Wholesale gasoline price ($/gal.) = 0.3064 +
0.03038 * crude oil price ($/bbl.)

6) Financial assumptions:

The data for this equation was monthly data 20002006 from EIA/DOE. However, longer and shorter
time periods were tested, and the results are
remarkably stable. The adjusted R2 for the equation is 0.93, meaning that 93% of the variability in
gasoline price over time is explained by changes in
the crude oil price.

The plant is 40% equity and 60% debt finance.
The debt interest rate is 8%, and the equity return
is 12%.
7) no value was assigned to the Co2 produced.
8) energy costs:

2) relationship between gasoline price and ethanol
price—The energy equivalent price of ethanol is
assumed to be 70% of the gasoline price. That is
slightly higher than the pure energy equivalence.

Natural gas
LP
Electricity
Total energy

3) relationship between corn price and ddGs
price—DDGS price is a function of the prices of
corn and soybean meal as follows:

$9.00/mil. BTU
$1.20/gal.
$0.06/KWH
$0.383/gal. of ethanol

9) other costs:
Chemical and enzyme costs $0.23/gal. of ethanol
Other processing costs
$0.09/gal. of
ethanol

DDGS price ($/ton) = 1.52 + 0.205 * soybean meal
price ($/ton) +

Given these assumed relationships and values, the
Tiffany/Eidman (University of Minnesota) spreadsheet model (2003) of a dry-mill ethanol plant was
used to calculate profitability and thus derive the
breakeven prices. Breakeven was assumed to be
the point of zero economic profit; that is, it includes the payment of debt and stipulated return
on equity. Clearly, any of these assumptions and
values could be modified in the future as conditions change.

21.98 * corn price ($/bu.)
Substituting a price for soybean meal of $200/ton
into this equation yields the equation used in the
model:
DDGS price ($/ton) = 42.52 + 21.98 * corn price
($/bu.)
All data is from USDA, monthly 2003-06. Illinois
prices were used for corn and soybean meal, and
Lawrenceburg, IN, for DDGS.

Source: (Hurt and Tyner, 2006)

It is assumed that 18 pounds of DDGS is produced
per bushel of corn used.
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